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ABSTRACT 
While living in the age of information, an inherent drawback to such high exposure to content 
lends itself to the precarious rise of misinformation. Whether it is called “alternative facts,” 
“fake news,” or just incorrect information, because of its pervasiveness in nearly every political 
and policy discussion, the spread of misinformation is seen as one of the greatest challenges to 
overcome in the 21st century. 1  As new technologies emerge, a major piece of both content 
creation and the perpetuation of misinformation are social media platforms like Twitter, 
Facebook, and YouTube.  As news events emerge, whether be a pandemic, a mass shooting, or 
an election campaign, it is difficult to divulge the facts from fiction when so many different 
“facts” appear. This study looks at 14,545,945 tweets generated in the wake of the 1 October 
mass shooting and its second anniversary to identify how much of the public response is fogged 
by information pollution, to identify what kind of misinformation is spread and how it spreads 
on Twitter and news coverage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Gray, R. (1 March 2017). Lies, propaganda and fake news: A challenge for our age. BBC. Retrieved from 
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170301-lies-propaganda-and-fake-news-a-grand-challenge-of-our-age 
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INTRODUCTION 
People are increasingly seeing the world through the lens of social media, particularly now, with 
the stay-at-home measures imposed to mitigate the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
people’s contact to the outside world resorting to being mostly, if not entirely, online. More 
than 2.4 billion people use social media (about one third of the world’s population), with 
roughly 330 million people using Twitter as of 2019 (Ortiz-Ospina, 2019).  The constant live-
updating, 280 character microblogging platform that is Twitter lets a person anywhere in the 
world with internet connection instantly find entertainment2, catch the news, share their 
opinions, and pass information along – whether that information is correct or not. As events in 
this world unfold, from local to international levels, the reactions and updates from people 
emerge just as fast. An example of this can be seen with a recent interview of the Mayor of Las 
Vegas on CNN that garnered over 320,000 tweets from all over the world in the scope of just 
five days (Blankenship et al., 2020). 
Never has the interconnectedness of the world been more apparent and while social media 
does have a profound positive impact, issues emerge with how the technology is utilized. After 
the tragedy of the 1 October massacre, the Las Vegas community was brought closer together 
with messages of support and the rallying cry of #vegasstrong that now defines the 
metropolitan area (Barrie, 2019).  At the same time, more malevolent interactions of 
accusations, rumors, conspiracies were initiated and continue to persist, fogging the public 
discourse and taking over the larger policy issues at hand.  
One of the greatest challenges facing the country and the world today is overcoming the 
information pollution that comes in a variety of forms, including mis- and dis-information. 
Although these disorders have been present throughout the ages, the ability to hide or 
fabricate your identity online while reaching millions of people is escalating the harmful 
ramifications possible. As Abraham Lincoln addressed in a speech, “our government rests in 
public opinion. Whoever can change public opinion, can change the government, practically just 
so much. Public opinion, on any subject, always has a ‘central idea,’ from which all its minor 
thoughts radiate.” The 2016 Presidential election highlighted the vast extent of information 
manipulation that took place with the rise of “fake news,” content meant to prey on the 
ignorance and emotional responses that is inherent to every human. By the end of that election 
cycle, false content ended up accumulating more engagement (likes, shares, comments) than 
mainstream, more factually reliable news (Silverman, 2017). The true extent of the impact that  
incorrect information has on our decision making is not well known but a study conducted by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research found that the continuing coverage and rapid 
spread of information by Twitter bots alone may have contributed about 3.23% of vote the 
                                                          
2 Depends on what you consider entertainment to be 
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Donald Trump (Smialek, 2018).  The rest of this paper is going to go through the bare bones of 
what misinformation is and will elaborate the pivotal role that social media outlets play in its 
spread. 
The diffusion of (mis)information is a nuanced subject and to uncover some of its complexities, 
the following elements are going to be looked at in detail: what kind of misinformation about 
the 1 October mass shooting spread and how lasting is the impact, if the misinformation is 
perpetuated by bots or humans, what kind of motivation could be behind the message and its 
intended audience, if the message has long term ramifications, and whether the message is 
supported or corrected by those who engage in the conversation.  
WHAT IS MISINFORMATION? 
The term “information pollution” can encapsulate a wide variety of incorrect information that is 
perpetuated online. This paper utilizes a framework developed and published with the Council 
of Europe called Information Disorder, which outlines the different phases, elements, and 
players contributing to this phenomena. Three different categories of information pollution can 
be separated into the following categories: misinformation, disinformation, malinformation. 
• Misinformation: occurs when false information is shared with no intent to harm 
• Disinformation: occurs when false information is shared with the intent to harm 
• Malinformation: occurs when genuine information is shared with the intent to harm,    
d                               e.g. leaks  
Figure 1: Shows a Venn diagram (modified from the Information Disorder report) that categorizes the 
different forms of information pollution that typically occur. 
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The three categories differ primarily in their intent to harm and the level of inaccuracy but the 
extent of information that can disseminate and its potential to impose harm can be equally as 
severe. In this study, since the intent to harm is difficult to discern, the incorrect information 
that is spread will all be placed under the blanket label of “misinformation.” There are various 
types of information disorders that can pervade from fabricated and manipulated content to 
more nuanced misinterpretation and false connection of content (Warle and Derakhshan, 
2017). Information disorder can also be perpetuated not only through text and stories but also 
though images, audio, and video. With the development of “deep-fakes” that can take 
authentic sources and manipulate it into fake information and because of how realistic these 
deep-fakes can appear, determining what is real is even a greater challenge for governments 
and citizens (Meserole and Polyakova, 2018). 
The diffusion of information pollution can be seen through three different elements of the 
agent, the message, and the interpreter. As outlined in Table 1 below, the tale of 
misinformation begins with the “Agent” that creates the falsified information for whatever 
motivation and diffused by the “Message” and the “Interpreter.” 
Table 1: Description of information pollution elements 
Element  Description  Characteristics of Element  
The Agent  Creates misinformation 
 Can be an official or unofficial actor  
 Can be part of group or done individually  
 Can have different motives (including 
political or financial)  
 Can use automated technology  
The Message 
What is communicated by 
the Agent and  what is 
distributed 
 Can be illegal  
 Can create long-term impact  
 Accuracy can be difficult to discern  
 Can per perpetuated through a variety of 
mediums (news, videos, audio, etc.) 
The Interpreter  Audience of the message 
 Message can be perpetuated or evolve 
with how different demographic groups 
interpret the information  
 
The vast combination of possible misinformation and the actors that spread and interpret the 
message can result in a never ending cycle of information pollution. Once a false message is 
out, it is easy for it to diffuse and get picked up in news coverage and publications that then get 
referenced back in social media posts, continuing the cycle.  A message that is successful at 
gaining traction typically contains content that perpetuates feelings of superiority, anger, or 
fear against another group.  
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 Role of social media in the spread of misinformation 
News companies and social media have a symbiotic relationship, as most media outlets now 
have a cross-platform approach to deliver their coverage that also includes social media 
channels. Meanwhile, the social media companies have incorporated separate tabs within their 
platform that only focus on the news or give “live” updates to trending events. Even traditional 
forms of journalism like newspapers and TV coverage increasingly utilize social media posts 
found on these platforms as their supporting evidence or as the entire story itself. The practical 
reason behind this utilization is that sharing news articles on social media outlets increases the 
lifespan of that those articles have to mass exposure – from the media lifespan of 2.6 days 
without any media sharing to 3.2 days when also shared as a post (Carr, 2015).  For Twitter 
alone, the lifespan of an article is typically 2.5 days or 10-72 hours.  
Twitter is a platform that is generally most news-focused than the others with its content and is 
the third most popular social media outlet – behind Facebook and YouTube – to deliver news to 
its users (Shearer and Matsa, 2018). About two-thirds of Americans at least occasionally got 
their news on social media in 2018, even though more than half of social media consumers 
think that the news they see is inaccurate (Shearer and Matsa, 2018). The nature of information 
sharing and receiving has fundamentally changed in a short period of time since it has become 
so easy to share the information and we do not know how to correctly deal with it.   
BACKGROUND ON 1 OCTOBER 
As mass shootings are becoming a marker of American life, on October 1st 2017, Las Vegas 
joined an ever-increasing list of communities that suffered similar tragedies. Stephen Paddock 
opened fire from his hotel window at Mandalay Bay on a crowd of 22,000 concert-goers at the 
91 Route Harvest Festival, killing 58 and injuring more than 850 people (Corcoran et al., 2019). 
This was the largest mass casualty shooting in the history of the United States. It began at 10:05 
pm with Paddock firing with assault rifles (24 in total) he had snuck into this hotel room in the 
days before and ended at about 10:15pm with his suicide before the SWAT team could break 
into his room (Corcoran et al., 2019). The first public account of the shooting came from a 
tweet about ten minutes after the first shots began. Twitter remained a crucial element in the 
communications of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) throughout the 
emergency and the investigation that followed. 
Chaos and confusion engulfed the scene immediately, and just as quickly people took to their 
social media accounts to warn others of danger or send their thoughts and prayer, fiery debate 
also emerged with accusations of what might have happened at the scene. The shooter left no 
note or manifesto behind, not that such a vile act should even be attempted to be given a 
logical reason, but the absence of any affiliations or motivations has resorted to insufficient 
guessing about the shooter and the motives behind the act. This is shown by the public 
discussions that prevailed on social media after the shooting, and the claims that were most 
popular attempted to make up for the void.  
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Popular claims concerning the shootings 
Although there was a huge variety in the accusations, conspiracies, and falsehoods that were 
spread online concerning the shooting, the following section outlines some of the main 
misinformation topics that were spread and are compared to the conclusions found in the 
official LVMPD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report published along with other 
sources.  
There were multiple shooters: 
This is one of the earliest incorrect pieces of information that was spread. Partly because the 
initial alerts from the police department did not know how many active shooters there were. 
However, the claims did not stop even after police found Paddock to be the only shooter.   
→ One of the findings of the official investigation concluded that, “Paddock acted alone. 
Despite early reports of multiple shooters in different locations, no evidence exists to 
substantiate any of those reports,” (LVMPD, 2018). 
ISIS was responsible for shooting: 
Immediately following the shooting, ISIS claimed responsibility for it and stated that the shooter 
was a “soldier of the Islamic State,” without providing any evidence (Smith, 2017). 
→ No evidence was provided by ISIS to the shooter’s connection to it, the report also states 
that, “there was no evidence of radicalization or ideology to support any theory that Paddock 
supported or followed any hate group or any domestic or foreign terrorist organization,” 
(LVMPD, 2018). 
Shooter was a Muslim or converted to Islam:  
This was often coupled with the ISIS claim and that the shooter had recently converted to Islam 
and even traveled to the Middle East to be trained by the terrorist organization.  
→ Although the shooter did travel to the Middle East on a cruise, there is no evidence of 
connection to Islamic State. Again, the “investigators could not link Paddock to any specific 
ideology,” and according to his girlfriend, “Paddock was not a religious person.” (LVMPD, 2018). 
“Going to die” warning: 
This claim suggested that the girlfriend of the shooter, Marilou Danley, was at the concert 
venue and announced to people by her that they were “all going to die tonight” before the 
shooting occurred.  
→ Danley was out of the country when the shooting took place and did not get back to the 
United States until October 4th, 2017 (LVMPD, 2018). 
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Shooter’s identity: 
Users identified the wrong people as the shooter, most notably Geary Danley, who has the 
same last name as the girlfriend of the gunman, Marilou Danley. Other false claims include that 
shooter was a 32 year-old Sam Hyde and had adopted a new name of Samir Al-Hajeed. 
→ Shooter was Stephen Paddock and at no point went under any aliases.  
Shooter was a left-wing extremist:   
This claims was often coupled with claims of the shooter’s identity and motives behind the 
shooting, which was perpetuated by a story written by the Gateway Pundit.  
→ Danley stated, “Paddock didn’t talk in length about politics and did not belong to any 
political organizations. Paddock did express a dislike for the Obama administration and was 
happy when President Trump was elected … Paddock did not comment on the topic of gun 
control and did not display any racial bias,” (LVMPD, 2018). 
Shooter was part of Antifa: 
This claim was often coupled with claims of the shooter’s political beliefs and the shooter’s 
identity. The misinformation included claims that Antifa and ISIS literature was found in the 
hotel room of the shooter.  
→ As previously established, ties to any political groups or organizations were not identified. 
The only document found was a handwritten note with distance/bullet drop calculations 
(LVMPD, 2018). 
Shooter was part of an anti-Trump army: 
This included reference to the shooter’s alleged political affiliation and a picture of a man 
resembling Paddock that was shown at a Bernie Sanders rally in Reno earlier in the year.   
→ As previously established, ties to any political groups or organizations were not present.  
Shooter chose the venue because there would be many conservatives in the crowd:  
This claim was also coupled often with the shooter’s alleged political affiliation and the 
assumption that since the Route Harvest Festival is a country festival, many people who are 
conservative or Republican would be there 
→ Paddock originally booked a room at The Ogden in late September that overlooked the Life Is 
Beautiful music festival and, “exhibited behavior which was similar to his time spent at 
Mandalay Bay.” The shooter also booked rooms for a hotel during the Lollapalooza music 
festival in Chicago in August and had Internet searches that included "biggest open air concert 
venues in USA" and "how crowded does Santa Monica Beach get,” in May of 2017 (LVMPD, 
2018). 
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Shooting was a hoax: 
People also started to claim that the shooting was made-up, “fake news,” or an “insider job” as 
sometimes claimed the 9/11 terrorist attack (Bell, 2018).  
Fake missing people: 
Several accounts announced missing friends or relatives that did not exist or were not missing 
(Ohlheiser, 2019).  
→ It was later found that these accounts lied to get more followers and online attention 
(Ohlheiser, 2019). 
METHODOLOGY 
This study utilizes data from the UNLV Libraries, collected by Thomas Padilla and Miranda Barrie 
that includes 14,108,104 tweets created from September 30, 2017 until October 7, 2017 at 5:00 
pm PDT. The term “vegas” was used as the criteria for the collection of tweets. A response with 
this large number of tweets is significant, as the more typical number of tweets responding to 
mass shootings that occurred more recently (like the El Paso or Odessa shootings as examples) 
fluctuated around 1 million. This study also utilizes one of the collections conducted by the 
author of this paper on the second anniversary of the shooting and includes 437,841 tweets 
created from September 27, 2019 until October 6, 2019. Table 2 further describes the data. 
These tweets were collected using the open-source command line tool known as Twarc, which 
archived the tweets in JSONL format.   
Table 2: Summary of Twitter collections pertaining to study 
Collection  Search term  Start of collection  End of Collection  # of tweets  
1-Oct 2017 vegas Sat Sep 30 02:57:03 Tue Oct 07 17:00:00 14,108,104 
1-Oct 2019 vegas Fri Sep 27 09:48:32 Sun Oct 06 17:24:17 437,841 
 
Because the topic of misinformation is so expansive, news stories highlighting tweets that 
included misinformation in them were used as the starting point to find tweets. Tweets that 
contained specific words, phrases, and users pertaining to information pollution were 
extracted. Multiple phrases or words can pertain to a topic - for example, the claim that ISIS is 
responsible for the shooting can have Twitter entries that include “ISIS,” “ISIL,” “Islamic State.”  
Conversely, it is also possible for tweets pertaining to the topic to not include any explicit 
mention of said topic and unfortunately the scope of this study is unable to account for those 
kind of tweets.  
If there were multiple search terms for a single topic, tweets corresponding to each of those 
terms would be extracted and grouped together in “clusters” that coincide with the topic. This 
also accounts for tweets that contain multiple details of misinformation and/or on different 
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topics, such tweets were included in multiple clusters. The list of qualifiers and their 
corresponding “clusters” can be seen in greater detail in Appendix A.  
After the tweets were sorted in their clusters, any duplicate tweets were removed. A single 
tweet is rich in information, containing more than 150 different data variables and for the 
scope of this study, the variables of interest (created at, full text, tweet id, user id, username, 
location hashtags) were then obtained and used for the analysis. Table 3 goes over the 
variables of interest and describes them using the definitions found in the Twitter Developer 
dictionary (Twitter). Misinformation is also spread through video and pictures, however this 
study will focus on the written misinformation that can be detected from the full text of the 
recorded tweet.  
Table 3: Description of tweet variables 
Variable Description  
Created at UTC time when this Tweet was created. 
Full Text entire text of the tweet 
Tweet ID unique identifier for this Tweet 
User ID identifier for this User 
Screen_name The screen name, handle, or alias that this user identifies 
themselves with. screen_names are unique but subject to change 
Location user-defined location for this account’s profile 
Hashtags  hashtags mentioned in the Tweet or Retweet 
 
Since the “location” variable is self-identified, it may not mean that the user is at that indicated 
location, but it can signify the place that the user has emotional connections with. There are 
other geographical variables like “coordinate” and “place” that give more accurate information, 
but do not  have many entries within them since it is a feature that the user has to manually 
enable. A potential benefit to using “location” is that it allows for the opportunity to identify 
the presence of Twitter bots easier, as many bots often have strange entries for their locations 
or the same locations across multiple accounts (Barojan, 2018).  
 Figure 2: General overview of data processing 
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DATA AND RESULTS 
The tweets for each of the topic were divided in the categories of “Claim” and “Check”. The 
“Claim” category which indicates that the entry supported the misinformation or introduced 
the Message, therefore instigating the spread information pollution. Tweets attempting to 
correct the false information or question the validity of pronounced accusations are sorted 
under the “Check” category. These categories are going to be divided and sorted by the same 
protocol for the rest of the paper. Note: There is an inherent bias of more entries toward the 
“Claim” category since even tweets that contain more neutral messages can be construed as 
still supporting the misinformation. Top 10 Hashtags used within each cluster is available in 
Appendix B, any key findings from the hashtags will also be depicted here.  
There were multiple shooters 
Starting with the claims that the shooting was not solely done by Paddock, the engagements 
amount to 66,667 of extracted tweets in total. Figure 3 shows the number of tweets per day 
throughout the 2017 collection, with the greatest amount of entries recorded the day after the 
shooting with 29,977 entries that gradually taper off. No fact checking tweets about this topic 
were recognized.  
       Figure 3: “Multiple shooters” tweets per day                    Figure 4: Tweets from the U.S. vs not 
 
The location of the tweets shown in Figure 3 were categorized between domestic vs. foreign 
entries to see how localized the conversation is. Foreign interference and meddling in U.S. 
domestic policy was another issue that came to limelight during the 2016 election and since the 
shooting received international attention, it would be interesting to see if any trends in 
“Foreign” participation emerge.  Figure 4 shows a pie chart depicting the ratio of tweet entries 
originating in the United States vs. other counties with 89% of the entries originating in the 
United States. About 984 tweets concerning multiple shooters were recorded in the 2019 
collection, many people were still not convinced that there was only one shooter.  
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ISIS was responsible for shooting 
A total of 216,764 tweets concerned the discussion of this claim. This time, the discussion for 
this topic contained fact checking tweets. As can be seen in Figure 5, similar to the “multiple 
shooters” discussion, the greatest amount of generated tweets occurred on October 2nd, 2017. 
The number of tweets quickly decreased but had a small recovery of conversations on October 
6th, 2017. The fact-checking tweets only amounted to a fourth of the tweets perpetuating the 
misinformation and quickly decreased in mentions.  
Figure 5: “ISIS responsible” tweets per day 
 
Figure 6 shows the ratio of tweets located in the U.S. vs. internationally within tweets that 
propagate or try to correct the misinformation. There is a greatest share of international 
responses that spread misinformation with 23% of the “Claim” responses. While being 11% of 
the “Check” responses. No entries were logged in the 2019 collection for this topic.  
Figure 6: Locations of “Claim” and “Check” Tweets 
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Shooter was a Muslim or converted to Islam 
A total of 37,913 tweets were recorded for this conversation and included a more divided 
discussion that feature more “fact checking” tweets than the previous conversations. AS Figure 
7 shows, the greatest number of recoded tweets was again on October 2nd, 2017 where the 
topic was widely debated but “fact checking” quickly decreasing within a day.  
 Figure 7: “Shooter was Muslim” tweets per day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 also shows greater participation from the international community in perpetuating 
tweets. While this topic garnered a great response, only 36 entries were recorded in the 2019 
collection that still claimed that Paddock was Muslim. 
Figure 8: Locations of “Claim” and “Check” Tweets 
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Since this discussion was so heated, different patterns of hashtag usage also emerged that are 
highlighted in a generated word cloud shown in Figure 9 below, created with Jason Davies 
Word Cloud Generator. It shows the top 150 hashtags used by those who claim the shooter was 
Muslim. 
 Figure 9: Hashtags used in “Claim” Tweets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 10: Hashtags used in “Check” Tweets 
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The hashtags used highlight the different points-of-view of the two sides and what they pay 
attention to or value, with Figure 9 showing popular hashtags like #notallmuslims, #MAGA, 
#terrorist and Figure 10 showing popular hashtags from the “fact checking” tweets that include 
#guncontrolnow, #muslimban, #islamophobia.  
“Going to die” warning 
This did not have any tweets that qualified as fact checking or questioning the allegations that 
the shooter’s girlfriend told concert goers they were going to die. Figure 11 shows a total of 
22,449 were extracted with the greatest response being on October 2nd, 2017 again. This 
discussion follows closely with the trends seen with the discussion of multiple shooters. 
 Figure 11: “Warning” tweets per day 
 Figure 12: Locations of “Claim” and “Check” Tweets 
Figure 12 depicts the share of misinformation 
tweets with 89% of them originating from the 
United States. Low numbers of tweets concerning 
this topic were identified in the 2019 collection, 
with 201 entries.  
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Shooter’s identity 
The false allegations concerning the identity of the shooter amount to 1036 entries, Figure 13 
shows that number of tweets that pertained to the topic per day. The greatest number of 
tweets were recorded on October 2nd, 2017 and in a rare instance, more “fact checking” tweets 
were present however the amount of tweets again quickly decreased the following days while 
the allegations increased on October 4th, 2017.  
 Figure 13: “Shooter’s identity” tweets per day 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 shows that there is also a greater participation from other countries on both sides of 
the discussion, with 28% of the “Claim” tweets and 48% of the “Check” tweets not originating in 
the United States.  
 Figure 14: Locations of “Claim” and “Check” Tweets 
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Shooter was part of an anti-Trump army 
13,166 tweets were recorded that pertained to the discussion of whether the shooter was 
“anti-Trump” and was part of the some militia plotting against Trump. This discussion was often 
pairing with the allegation that Paddock belonged to Antifa (that had a discussion spanning 
40,933 tweets) but the two topics had a similar trend, so only the anti-Trump discussion will be 
highlighted. Figure 15 shows that the greatest response was still seen on October 2nd, 2017 
unlike the other discussions, the claims mentioned here did not decrease as quickly after that 
initial surge. This topic did not have any tweets trying to fact check and question the discussion.  
 Figure 15: “Shooter was anti-Trump” tweets per day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Locations of “Claim” and “Check” Tweets 
Figure 16 depicts the location of origin of the tweets 
within the discussion and shows that most of the 
misinformation is spread within the United States.  
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Are humans or bots behind these interactions? 
To find some initial results whether the interactions that we are seeing within the discussion 
are real or manufactured by automated bots, a web-based program called Hoaxy is used to 
search tweets or articles shared on Twitter and visualize the engagement between accounts. 
The visualizations also utilized another web-based program called Botometer that analyzes the 
accounts and identifies who behaves more human- or bot-like.  
The top 20 stories - with articles that include the ISIS, Antifa, fake missing people, FBI cover-up, 
and more – were selected and analyzed by Hoaxy. Out of the 989 accounts analyzed, 432 
accounts received a Botometer score of 0, meaning that those accounts behave the most 
human-like while 15 accounts were given a score of 5, meaning they are most bot-like 
(Botometer). Table 4 depicts the entire distribution of scores classified in the search.  
Table 4: Distribution of human- and bot-like behavior from accounts citing news articles 
Score  1 2 3 4 5 
Number of 
accounts 
432 241 172 86 15 
 
About 11% of the accounts can be considered as highly suspected of being bots (if you count 
those with a score of 4 and 5). If you included accounts that have any degree of speculation 
that it may be bot, the percentage would then increase to 54%. This would still be less than the 
overall average for Twitter, which typically has 66% of the any shared news links come from 
suspected bots (Wojcik, 2018). 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
To begin to unravel the complex behavior of the spread of misinformation, tweets containing 
mentions of false information (both those who support and question the claims) we extracted 
from two Twitter collections concerning the 1 October shooting. The discussion for the most 
pervasive rumors were the highest on October 2nd, 2017 the day after the shooting. The 
conversations quickly decreased in engagement, within a few days of the shooting as national 
attention feigned. The amount of the identified false claims were much higher than the 
attempted corrections, with the exception of the discussion about the shooter’s identity, and 
the amount of fact checking tweets decreased much steeper than the perpetuation of false 
claims. The majority of tweets within each topic were made by people living or having a strong 
emotional connection to the United States. Engagement from other countries is typically higher 
in conversation that spread the misinformation. Conversations concerning if ISIS was 
responsible for the shooting garnered the most attention and had the greatest engagement 
compared to the other topics.  
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
“People can foresee the future only when it coincides with their own wishes, and the most 
grossly obvious facts can be ignored when they are unwelcome,” this statement by George 
Orwell can also be applied to the past and the interpretation of any fact that is presented to an 
individual (Horton, 2007). Attempting to deal with information disorders is walking a fine line 
between having no effect in renegading the dangers of false claims and infringing on the 
freedoms of speech and access to information. A recent example of this can be seen with the 
Hungarian parliament, which passed legislation that allows for them to prosecute and imprison 
any journalist that they deem as spreading “fake news,” (IPI, 2020). Although many Hungarian 
independent journalists fear these measures are rather intended to stifle any coverage that is 
critical to the government’s handling of the crisis. 
The problem is that action taken to regulate mis- and dis-information often results in declining 
transparency of information and the confinement of the media – while reverse should occur. 
Dealing with misinformation can be analogous to wearing a seatbelt or riding a bike with a 
helmet on.  Even with regulations emplaced that people must wear their seatbelt, not everyone 
does but the first course of action is not to prosecute and imprison them for their disregard of 
safety. The following are some recommendations for actors to consider.  
Government (Federal, State, and Local) 
It is difficult to divulge at which specific level of government action against information 
pollution needs to be taken as it can be spread from anywhere in the world, but any action 
taken do need to be coordinated across all levels. The government could impose fines on 
individuals and organizations that start false information meant to be malicious and harmful. 
The identification of such information can be done by an independent agency on a national 
level that would be responsible for warning the nation of the false information and providing 
evidence of intended harm and falsehood of the content.  
The federal government can also create cybersecurity trainings and courses that which would 
be publicly available and would teach their citizens how to identify information disorders. Doing 
this on a national level is important as state and local governments may not provide the 
autonomy needed to effectively instruct individuals. All levels of government can sponsor 
programs that aim to continue developing detection programs that can more effectively and 
reliably identify false information and fake accounts of social media. 
Twitter 
The social media platform recently released an update to their site that included labels for 
tweets containing potentially manufactured and/or harmful information. Figure 17 shows a 
screenshot taken of Twitter’s categorization of how they will treat claims found with different 
degrees of severity (Roth and Pickles, 2020).  
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Figure 17: Action to be taken by Twitter based by severity of identified claims. 
It is also essential to continue to target content that is amplified by automation and develop 
tools that are more effective at identifying bot activity. While warnings and labels are 
considerable steps forward, it is important to make fact-checking tools more readily available 
and popular with users – perhaps even having a tab or button that users that could press on a 
tweet or account that then uses open-source programs to identity whether a tweets contains 
false claims or a user displays bot-like activity. This also produces engagement with the user 
and may even help to stimulate the users into doing more thorough fact-checking and research 
into an issue.  
Media 
Given the partnership that media corporations have with social media outlets, they are a crucial 
piece to mitigating misinformation. News organizations often make the mistake of legitimizing 
misinformation while reporting on it or giving the warning that information is false (West, 
2017). Such was evident within the 1 October collections, with instances where individuals 
posted neutral tweets that tried to highlight the false information and unfortunately could 
easily be interpreted as supporting the claims. News organizations can also provide outlines 
and publicly available access to news literacy curriculum that would teach how to differentiate 
between fact and fiction.  
Individuals 
A revolutionary step that each individual can take is to rethink how they choose to deal with 
misinformation that they come across. False information is frequently most successful in 
acquiring attention when it targets emotions of fear and anger against another group. Keeping 
this in mind and being skeptical of the intentions behind such a post can keep an individual 
from impulsively retweeting and legitimizing the message (Kaplan, 2019). The attitudes taken 
towards users that perpetuate the claims can also be counter-productive. As a claim is 
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introduced and becomes fiercely contested, those who recognize that a claim is false can treat 
those who spread the claim with contempt and ridicule. This becomes problematic when you 
consider the human propensity for confirmation bias, or a ‘myside bias’ that a person will 
defend (even believe in more strongly) if conflicting information and attitudes are introduced 
(Kolbert, 2017). What starts as a disagreement escalates into an emotional debate divided 
across political ideologies.  
Every person can also take matters into their own hands and use open-source programs like 
Botometer, Hoaxy, StopFake to check content they find suspicious themselves. While there is a 
tendency to go to national coverage of events, individuals can also support local news outlets 
and public service media to use their coverage as a check to networks and posts that are geared 
to be more political.  
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APPENDIX A: Identifiers for clusters  
 
 
There were multiple shooters: “shooters” 
ISIS responsible for shooting: “ISIS,” “Islamic” 
Shooter was a Muslim or converted to Islam: “Muslim,” “Islamic”  
“Going to die” warning: “going to die,” “Marilou” 
Shooter’s identity: “geary,” “sam hyde,” “Al-hajeed” 
Shooter was part of Antifa: “Antifa”  
Shooter was part of an anti-Trump army: “anti-trump,” “anti trump”  
 
 
Other Clusters:  
Shooters political affiliation and activities: “democrat,” “Bernie Bro,” “liberal,” “leftist,” “left-
wing,” “progressive,” “Rachel Maddow,” “October Revolution” 
Platforms spreading misinformation: “4chan,” “gateway pundit”  
Discussions of misinformation: “fake news,” “rumor,” “without evidence,” “propaganda,” 
“troll,” “bot,” “hoax,” “censor,” “algorithm,” “conservative,” “right-wing,” “disinformation,” 
“misinformation” 
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APPENDIX B: Top 10 Hashtags used from each discussion  
 
There were multiple shooters 
Rank Claims 
 Hashtags Uses 
1 #TrueMAGA 2753 
2 #LasVegasShooting 1987 
3 #TellTheTruth 1584 
4 #LasVegas 780 
5 #ma4t 598 
6 #VegasShooting 556 
7 #Vegas 513 
8 #MandalayBay 379 
9 #FLASH 377 
10 #BlueLivesMatter\nPolice 300 
 
ISIS takes responsibility for shooting 
Rank Claims  Checks 
 Hashtags Uses Hashtags Uses 
1 #ISIS 15,716 #BREAKING 264 
2 #FBI 12,931 #ISIS 147 
3 #LasVegas 6,466 #LasVegas 65 
4 #WarRoom 4,675 #FLASH 62 
5 #StephenPaddock 4,446 #Vegas 55 
6 #Veg 3,389 #UPDATE 33 
7 #LasVegasShooting 2,968 #LasVegasShooting 18 
8 #BREAKING 2,923 #tcot 13 
9 #Vegas 2,565 #RT 11 
10 #AlexJonesShow 1,787 #shooting 10 
 
Shooter was Muslim 
Rank Claims  Checks 
 Hashtags Uses Hashtags Uses 
1 #lasvegas 1105 #shooting 5963 
2 #thursdaythoughts 652 #guncontrolnow 1013 
3 #vegasif 638 #muslimban 93 
4 #notallmuslims 599 #lasvegas 22 
5 #vegas 405 #vegas 17 
6 #guncontrol 376 #stephenpaddock 16 
7 #ma4t 294 #vegasshooting 14 
8 #lasvegasshooting 216 #islamophobia 13 
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9 #muslim 197 #lasvegasshooting 12 
10 #lasvegasattack 146 #isis 11 
 
“Going to die” warning 
Rank Claims 
 Hashtags Uses 
1 #lasvegasshooting 1423 
2 #truemaga 1153 
3 #mariloudanley 513 
4 #vegas 320 
5 #lasvegas 149 
6 #tucker 121 
7 #hanni 118 
8 #teamkj 61 
9 #lasvegasshooter 53 
10 #tcot 40 
 
Shooter’s Identity 
Rank Claims  Checks 
 Hashtags Uses Hashtags Uses 
1 #MarilouDonley's 11 #LasVegasShootings 12 
2 #GunControlNow 10 #FakeNews 8 
3 #NeverTrump 8 #LasVegasShooting 7 
4 #Vegas 8 #Geary 5 
5 #vegasshooting 8 #Trump 5 
6 #LasVegas 7 #LasVegas 4 
7 #mandalaybay 7 #fake 4 
8 #MandalayBay 6 #Danley 3 
9 #BREAKING 5 #UniteBlue 3 
10 #LasVegasShooting 5 #altright 3 
 
Shooter was part of Antifa 
Rank Claims  Checks 
 Hashtags Uses Hashtags Uses 
1 #vegas 5533 #Antifa 11 
2 #antifa 5029 #LasVegasShooting 10 
3 #warroom 4452 #39 8 
4 #vegasshoot 2188 #Conspiracy 5 
5 #lasvegasshooting 1709 #LasVegas 4 
6 #isis 1127 #antifa 4 
7 #breaking 1036 #DomesticTerrorism 3 
8 #lasvegas 1036 #ISIS 3 
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9 #maga 635 #MSM 3 
10 #resistance 563 #StephenPaddock 3 
 
Shooter was anti-Trump 
Rank Claims 
 Hashtags Uses 
1 #StephenPaddock 1382 
2 #LasVagasShooting 351 
3 #LawAndOrder 203 
4 #Vegas 179 
5 #PrayForLasVegas 148 
6 #ANTIFA 107 
7 #resistance 94 
8 #antifa 90 
9 #LasVegas 60 
10 #shooting 60 
 
 
